Angels and Demons by Paul M. Quay SJ (1981)

ANGELS AND DEMONS: THE TEACHING OF IV LATERAN
PAUL M. QUAY, S.J.
Saint Louis University

UNTIL THE RISE of liberal Protestantism, Christians of all kinds acknowledged the existence of both angels and demons as part of their
faith.1
More recently, however, even some Catholics have begun to have
doubts. Those theologians, of course, who wish to be Catholic and yet
deny or see as dubious the existence of angels or demons must argue that
beliefs concerning them are, in any event, not matters of faith- At this
point a difficulty arises for a Catholic which is not usually perceived by
a liberal Protestant. Any discussion by Catholics concerning the existence
and nature of angels must deal with the statement of the Fourth Lateran
Council in its constitution Firmiter.
We firmly believe and straightforwardly confess that one alone is true God… one
[single] principle of all that is: creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual
and corporeal: who by His omnipotent power, together with the beginning of
time, formed from nothing both kinds of creature, the spiritual and the corporeal,
the angelic, that is, and the sensible;2
and then the human, constituted of spirit
and body as if common to both. For the devil and other demons have indeed been
created by God as good by nature; but they, of themselves, became evil. Man,
however, sinned at the suggestion of the devil.3
1
Anabaptists were the chief exception; cf. G. H. Tavard (A. Caquot, J. Michl), Die Engel
(Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte 2/2b; Freiburg: Herder, 1968) 91-93 (French translation:
Les anges [Paris: Cerf, 1971]). This concise but far from superficial compendium serves as
an excellent introduction to the history of Christian thought concerning angels.
2
“Sensible world” here translates mundanam. What is intended is what we often call
the “material world.” Though our current English use of “material” (which I shall use
nontechnically throughout this article) is in most contexts closer to corporalem than to
materiellem in the theological senses this had in the thirteenth century, yet “material
world” here could too easily suggest a position concerning the angels that the Council in
fact carefully avoided. Since the Council was concerned not to offend the Greeks (cf. η. 38
below) it could not here use materiellem in contradistinction to angelicam; for the Eastern
tradition had long spoken of the angels both as “spirits” and as “material,” i.e., limited and
spatially circumscribed. On this see, e.g., John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa 2, 3 (PG 94,
866); Tavard, Die Engel 59. The debate some fifty years later between St. Bonaventure and
St. Thomas concerning “spiritual matter” in angels shows that the Eastern tradition was
not without its resonances in the West.
3DS 800. Throughout this paper I shall mean by “angel” what is specified here:
incorporeal, spiritual (and thus personal) beings, not parts of our visible cosmos, created by
God and named for their office as God’s messengers to men; cf., e.g., Gregory the Great,
Horn. 34, 8 (PL 76, 1250).
20
ANGELS AND DEMONS 21
Till recently, Catholics generally have taken this statement as solemnly
defining the existence and spiritual nature of angels, a definition which
declares these points to be matters of faith, knowingly to refuse which
would be to cut oneself off from the faith of the Church by heresy. A
number of contemporary theologians, however, have argued, not implausibly, that this statement merely takes for granted angels’ existence
without ever directly raising this as a question. Since IV Lateran was
convened to deal with then current doctrinal and disciplinary difficulties,
in Firmiter it was concerned directly only with those matters of faith
which the heretics of that day, the Cathars, denied. But Cathar and
Catholic alike took for granted that angels and demons exist; the dispute
dealt with whether they are uncreated, basically independent of God, and
whether the demons are evil by essence, principles of evil in the world.
Firmiter, then, does define that God created all that is, including whatever
angels and demons there may be, and that evil has entered the world by
the choice of created wills alone. But since no one doubted that angels or
demons exist, on what grounds could the Council have intended to define
this?
This line of argument seems to have first been opened up in a small
article by Darlapp,4
which stands as the fountainhead of recent discussions. The majority of those who agree with Darlapp on this5
concur also
that the existence of angels and demons is a matter of Catholic faith,
though not formally defined.6
A few, however, go much further and argue
that the existence of angels and demons, understood as personal, purely
4
A. Darlapp, “Dämon,” LThK 3 (1959) 142-43; “Demons,” Sacramentum mundi 2 (ed.
A. Darlapp, Κ. Rahner, et al.; New York: Herder and Herder, 1968) 70-73, is essentially the
same article.
5
Theologians as competent in this domain as J. Michl (“Angels: Theology of,” NCE 1,
506-16, at 513) and R. Haubst (“Engel,” LThK 3, 867-72, at 870, ΙΠ) do not agree. It is not
clear exactly where K. Rahner stands. Some of his remarks (“Angel,” Sacramentum mundi
1, 27-35, at 32-34 passim) seem to indicate a solemn definition by IV Lateran of the
existence of angels, good and bad; yet his continued collaboration with Darlapp in this area
and lack of any clear dissociation from his position make it seem more likely that Rahner’s
own position is closer to Darlapp’s than the one presented here.
6
E.g., W. Kasper, “Die Lehre der Kirche vom Bösen,” 68-84 in Die Macht des Bösen
und der Glaube der Kirche (ed. R. Schnackenburg; Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1979) 76-77; “Das
theologische Problem des Bösen,” 41-70 in Teufel-Dämonen-Bessessenheit: Zur
Wirklichkeit des Bösen (2d. ed.; ed. W. Kasper and K. Lehmann; Mainz: MatthiasGrünewald, 1978) 53, n. 1; K. Lehmann, “Der Teufel—Ein personales Wesen?”, 71-98 in
Teufel-Dämonen 81-82; M. Schmaus, God and Creation (tr. from Der Glaube der Kirche;
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1979) 221-222; M. Seeman, “Die Engel,” Mysterium salutis 2
(Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1967) 977; Christlicher Glaube und Dämonologie {Nachkonziliare
Dokumentation 55; Aschaffenburg: Pattloch, 1975); this “Vatican expert” is cited in Lehmann’s “Der Teufel” 81-82, but the precise import of his remarks remains unclear from
that brief quotation.
22 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
spiritual beings, is not a matter of faith at all.7
The whole approach, however, is never more than sketched. No careful
examination of the text of Firmiter has been attempted nor investigation
of its thrust and exact intent.8
Still less, obviously, have these arguments
been tested against the results of such investigations. This present article,
therefore, seeks to examine the above and related arguments concerning
the teaching of IV Lateran and to confront them with what the Council
actually said and, so far as we can ascertain, intended. This will enable us
to discover whether, on this one basis at least, we are held as Catholics
to believe that angels and demons exist.9
We presume that the authors
mentioned accept that whatever the Council in fact intended to define as
of faith is indeed an essential element or part of the content of Catholic
faith.10
7
E.g., P. Schoonenberg, S.J., God’s World in the Making (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1964) 8-9 n. 16; the authors of the so-called “Dutch Catechism,” as presented by R. van der Hart, O.P., The Theology of Angels and Devils (Notre Dame, Ind.: Fides, 1972) 10-12; H. Haag (with K. Elliger, Β. Lang, M. Limbeck), Teufelsglaube (Tübingen: Katzmann, 1974) 130-31; E. Lussier, S.S.S., “Satan,” Chicago Studies 13 (1974) 3-19, at 10; C. R. Mayer, “Speak of the Devil,” ibid. 14 (1975) 7-18, at 9-13; G. Gonzalez, “Dios y el diablo:
Superación cristiana del dualismo,” Ciencia tomista 104 (1977) 279-301, at 293-95, largely
derivative from Mayer and Haag. O. Semmelroth, S.J., “Abschied vom Teufel? Mächte und
Gewalten im Glaube der Kirche,” in Theologische Akademie 8 (ed. K. Rahner, S.J., and O.
Semmelroth, S.J.; Frankfurt: J Knecht, 1971) 48-69, must be added to this group. Though
delicate in his wording, he not only follows Darlapp in denying that Firmiter defines the
existence of demons (64-66) but goes on to treat their existence as doubtful and not a
certain object of faith (66-68). What is most puzzling is his quiet assumption that whatever
is not the direct object of solemn definition is open to doubt.
8
Darlapp does offer references which go outside this circle of discussion, but none of
them turns out even to have looked seriously at the text of Firmiter,
9
It is important to note that there is no place for a Catholic to talk about “believing in
angels” or “belief in the devil,” as is all too often done with unfortunate consequences
(Gonzalez, “Dios y el diablo” 285). Attention to theological language in this domain is
essential; cf. H. de Lubac, S.J., La foi chrétienne (2nd ed.; Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1970)
chap. 8, “Les solécismes chrétiens.”
10
Haag is a clear exception. He writes: “It is indisputable that, during the whole history
of the Catholic Church, the existence and activity of Satan and of the demons have been an
object of her proclamation of the faith and that the other Christian churches considered
themselves as very largely at one with her in this belief (Teufelsglaube 138). His whole
tome, of course, repudiates that “object of her proclamation of the faith.” This he sees
himself free to do apparently because “It [II Vatican] has .. . in fact contradicted earlier,
even defined teaching and thereby sanctioned the relativity of dogmatic assertions,” and
because, with no less misconstrual, he attributes to II Vatican a mandate to do all theology
on the grounds of sola Scriptura (Teufelsglaube 139), with the tacit understanding that
Scripture be interpreted by Haag or in accordance with his canons of critical method. With
this attitude, one wonders why he bothered giving even the few lines he did to IV Lateran’s
definition concerning the demons. He seems not to have noticed, either, that II Vatican
itself claimed to define nothing not already defined. If its teaching, then, on any point were
truly in contradiction with earlier definitions, it is the teaching of II Vatican that would, on
its own terms, have to be rejected.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 23
The position under discussion is, then, that IV Lateran did not formally
propose as revealed truth, to be believed by all, the existence of angels
and demons (or at least cannot be shown so to have proposed it). In
support of this position, two distinct even if related arguments are offered
which often, however, are slurred together: (1) The conciliar constitution
Firmiter presumes or presupposes the existence of angels and demons
but nowhere addresses this precise point directly; hence it cannot be said
to define it. (2) The heretics of the period believed in the existence of
angels and demons as much as did the Church. Their existence, then,
could not have been a point dividing heretics from orthodox believers.
Hence angehe or demonic existence was not a possible subject for a
definition. We consider these two arguments in turn.
I
1) The psychological core of the first argument is the persistent
assumption that the Council’s statements concerning the angels and
demons intended no other goal than to assert that God created all things
without exception, and that evil was introduced by the creature, both of
which assertions can be true even though no angels or demons should
ever have existed. The argument loses its plausibility, then, as soon as
one begins to note how much further dogmatic content there is in this
same passage.
It is indeed certain that the Council was deeply concerned to defend
God’s being the unique and sole creator of all things without exception.
Hence Firmiter takes over the phrase “creator of all things, visible and
invisible,” already utilized for just this purpose in Eastern professions of
faith prior to 325 and consecrated by I Nicaea and I Constantinople.11
This would seem to take care of the universality of His creative activity
as well as can be done, since it provides what logicians refer to as an
adequate distinction (in the thirteenth century, disjunctio exclusiva),
one such that all possible beings can be assigned properly to one or the
other of the two categories. However, for the heresies of the day (as we
shall see in more detail in Part II), the inadequate distinction between
the spiritual and the corporeal was far more strongly operative than the
adequate one between the visible and the invisible. The Cathars argued
that material things are themselves evil and were created by the devil,
the principle of evil, whereas all good things are spiritual and were created
by God. In such a context it is easy to see why Firmiter goes on to add
“spiritual things and corporeal ones,” making explicit that God is the
source and principle of these latter no less than of the former.
Having taken full care of this question of universality, then, the decree
11
A. Vacant, “Anges,” DTC 1/1, 1264-65.
24 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
devotes the lengthy final clause of this sentence to other aspects of
creation. The Council defines creation “in time” and creation de nihilo.
Both these points are directly related to the then controverted questions
as to whether God created all things immediately Himself or created at
least some of them through the mediation of angels and whether, moreover, at least these latter might have existed eternally, even though
created.12
As indicated by the arguments of St. Thomas two generations
later,13
these possibilities are all ruled out by this section of Firmiter. If
the Council then goes on to state explicitly that God established the
angelic, the cosmic, and the human orders of creation, and says this
directly and not in the somewhat oblique manner with which it settles
the questions of nonmediate creation and the temporality of all these
orders of creation, how can this clause be supposed to have no other
intent than to state that God created all things—an intent already more
than adequately provided for by what precedes?
The Cathars and their like all argued that sin reaches man precisely
from the side of his materiality, because material things as such are evil,
that is, not only originating in some sin but compelling man into moral
evil or even making him intrinsically sinful. The great majority of the
heretics, moreover, held that man’s corporeal state is the result of his
own sin (as well as the devil’s) and the cause of further sin. Hence it was
of prime importance that the Council speak first of a spiritual world, then
of a material one, and then of man as a natural composite, before any
question of sin is raised, his own or others’. The Council’s precise concern
was to show that man, already fully “constituted of spirit and body in
common,” had no principle of evil already witnin him—in particular, that
his materiality or corporeality was neither a cause nor a result of sin.
Following upon the assertion of the self-originated evil of the devil and
other demons, Homo vero … is a much more important statement than
simply, “Man sinned”—something no one doubted. Quite evidently, “at
the suggestion of the devil” does nothing to further that hypothetical
intent of the Council, whose sole content here is supposed to be that all
12
We may note in passing that if angels serve only as a more reverent way to represent
God’s actions with regard to the world, as some non-Catholics argue (e.g., Alliance Mondiale
des Religions, Anges, démons et êtres intermédiaires, 3° colloque, Paris, Jan. 1968 [ed. M.
Choisy and B. Grillot; Editions Labergerie, 1969] 208-10; C. Westermann, God’s Angels
Need No Wings (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979; from 2nd ed. of Gottes Engel brauchen keine
Flügel [Stuttgart: Kreuz, 1978]), it is hard to see what possible objection there could be to
having creation mediated by angels. Rather it would seem obligatory to ascribe material
creation to them, since it is man’s disgust or horror before the seeming foulnesses, cruelties,
and wastefulness of the material world that on this supposition led to the notion of angels
in the first place.
13
Expositio primae decretalis, nos. 1161, 1163, in Opuscula theologica 1 (ed. R. A.
Verardo; Turin: Marietti, 1954) 415-26. Cf. also Summa theologiae 1, 45, 5c; 46,1-3; 61,2c;
65, 3c.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 25
evil originates with.the creature. Instead, this phrase serves to underline
both the difference in status of men and demons with respect to the
possibility of redemption and also the purely spiritual origins of moral
evil.14
Finally, all the points to be adduced in Part II likewise belong to
the dogmatic intentions of the Council embodied in these few lines.
2) Though they share a common core, there are significant differences
among the positions of those who deny that Firmiter defined the existence
of angels and demons. These positions differ principally in the ways they
consider “angels” and “demons” to refer to the real world. A first group
of theologians concede them a metaphorical existence, that is, they see
them as imaginative constructs then universally utilized to explain wide
ranges of phenomena, both naturally occurring and supposedly given in
Scripture. Just as, for example, the medieval theory of nine heavens
offered a similarly obsolete way to speak some truth about the real
astronomical universe that we know, so angels and demons were used to
speak truly, say, of those real, natural powers and forces that provoke
awe and sacred fear in human consciousness.
Propositions about angels and demons have, on this view, an objective
reference; they can assert truth or falsehood about the world as seen from
within the psychocultural framework of IV Lateran that in our own
psychocultural framework we can more persuasively and effectively explain without any mention of angels or demons. What the Council was referring to, albeit without reflex awareness, in its conceptual framework must, then, be transcribed into our frame of reference if the same truths
are to be asserted by our propositions though differently expressed at the
imaginative level. We could make the same point as Firmiter were we to
assert, e.g., “One alone is true God… creator of all things of whatever
sort: who by His omnipotent power from the beginning of time formed
from nothing every kind of creature, however described in our human
categories ” For our present purposes, “every kind of creature” would
refer, as needed, to the reality in the world of each of the things that
have been claimed as the realities behind the term “angels.” Thus “angel”
may refer to God Himself as He speaks to or acts within our world or to
the created manifestations of His activity or to those powers of nature or
of our psyche which provoke dread in us.
a) Learned and devout as many of these theories appear, they seem
incompatible with IV Lateran. If angels are simply God-as-acting, say,
healing or punishing, how can they be His creatures? And who, then, are
the demons who appear in the next sentence? If angels are, rather, to be
created manifestations of His will to us (the stirrings of His grace within
us; His chastisements; those people or circumstances through which,
unexpectedly and mysteriously, He visits us), how then does Firmiter
14
We shall see this in Section I, 2, b.
26 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
present angels as pure spirits, an order of being other than the corporeal,
carefully distinguished from the human world? And again, how could His
created interventions freely make themselves evil to become demons? Or
yet again, how would His self-manifestations to man be created simul ab
initio temporis, whatever the precise meaning of that somewhat enigmatic phrase?
If angels are but personifications of the overawing and “sacral” aspects
of nature, society, or our own psychic experiences, Firmiter’s remarks
about the demons gain special importance. If we seek to bring these two
sentences into line with the interpretation two paragraphs back, they
might be recast, e.g., “For the powers of the physical universe et al were
indeed created by God and are by nature good, but some of them have by
themselves become evil (if judged by their effects upon man). And man’s
own sin took place under their influence.”15
Some take “evil” in such a transcription as physical or ontic evil,
implausible as this is, given the Cathars’ teachings. The sense of this part
of Firmiter would then be that such things as tornados, viruses, insect
pests, and floods, though good in themselves as part of the natural world order, can yet be regarded also as evil, since they can bring pain, emotional torment, and death to man. And from the fear of such material powers, wrongly regarded as malevolent spirits at work, man would fall
into sin, striving to placate them rather than trust in God while utilizing
his own powers to make the world safer for his kind.
A first difficulty, for those holding this position, is that such an
interpretation brings about self-contradiction, undercutting argument II
mentioned above that the Council’s teaching be a response only to
current heresies. For if “the devil and other demons” are but obsolete
cultural representations for aspects of the universe that man perceives as
ontic evils, then this definition does not touch at all the major heresies of
that day. These held either that there exists a spiritual principle of moral
(as well as physical) evil, not created by God at all but source of lesser
evil spirits and of all the material creation, or else that there is a sort of
spiritual protocreature, fallen himself, drawing away other angels into his
rebellion and forming from the elements, which God had created, the
15
The parenthetical phrase, or something similar, seems necessary if the discussion is to
continue at all, since no natural forces or psychic powers are free to make themselves other
than they are. It is this fact, presumably, that lies behind Mayer’s extraordinary wordings,
“if any creature was perceived by man to be evil, this was due to the wayward activity of
that creature itself’ (“Speak” 9), and “only two statements of the decree Firmiter should
be regarded as dogmas of the faith: .. . ; and 2) whatever of that creation has become evil
in the eyes of man has done so because of its own initiative” (“Speak” 10) [my emphasis].
For the sake of the argument, however, we may suppose the cultural transcription could
allow some interpretation such as we offer here (cf., e.g., van der Hart, The Theology 19-
25).
ANGELS AND DEMONS 27
material world, man’s body included. But, however convinced they may
have been that forces of the material universe can be physically hurtful
to man, the heretics were not heretics because of that all too evident fact.
If the Council is not using the phrase “the devil and other demons” to
mean some sort of morally evil spirits, then the Cathars’ errors are
untouched by the supposed condemnation.
Secondly, the context makes clear that the sin being discussed is that
of the first man. Now, it was common teaching then, as for centuries
before, that man was created with preternatural gifts, including actual or
possible immortality and freedom from disease and suffering. To argue
that the natural creation was already death-dealing to man before he fell
and that the Fall came as a result of his fear of death from such forces
would go directly counter to that teaching. Whatever one’s stand concerning the dependency of human death upon human sin and in whatever
way one wishes to explain that dependency, surely the matter was of
much too great an importance at that time to have been set aside by IV
Lateran in so obscure and hidden a manner as this interpretation would
require, even could one conceive some reason to think that the Council
would have wished to do so.
Neither can the Council, since it is speaking of man as first created, be
referring to our subconscious psychic and cultural powers. These may
act, as described, in us and provoke us to turn from God. But the common
teaching, then and even till now, has taken as certain Unfällen Adam’s
preternatural integrity or freedom from concupiscence and his possession
of an unwounded nature, free of moral obtuseness or weakness. Some
today would reject such notions of the first man, but we may safely leave
aside their opinions if what we are seeking is the mind of IV Lateran.
Finally, all such explanations ultimately make ontic evil an essential
element in God’s creation, with moral evil its consequence. But how
would a good creature tempt or “suggest” sin to sinless and not-yetconcupiscent man? If we interpret Homo vero… as “Man sinned, stirred
by his awe before cosmic or psychic forces and by his fascination with
them, in seeking to appease them by living in accord with their worldorder rather than the will of God,” then if these forces were in themselves
good before man’s sin, as they proceeded from God’s hand, why should
living in accord with them, in a totally good creation, be wrong? But this
implication that God is a source of ontic evil clashes head on with the
universally acknowledged intent of IV Lateran.
If, on the other hand, we try to follow more closely the seeming sense
of Firmiter and take “evil” as referring (though perhaps not exclusively)
to moral evil, i.e., to sin and the attitudes necessarily resulting from sin,
then the suggested transcriptions into our cultural framework simply fail
to make sense.
28 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
First, none of the entities taken as putative referents of the demons are
free agents capable of sin. Second, it is evident that to regard any such
powers of nature or of man as intrinsically generative of sin in man would
be to make God the author of sin, a doctrine rejected as vigorously by the
Cathars as by the Catholics, or to place oneself squarely with the heretics
being condemned by appealing to an uncreated but creative First Principle of evil.
If we take, instead, “the devil and other demons” to refer not to natural
powers inducing sin but to some innate disposition or inclination to sin,
whether arising through man’s physical interactions with the sensible
world or through some morally defective aspects of his own being, this
too is contrary to the directly intended point of the definition. For it is
essential to the conciliar purposes that there is only one principle, one
source of created being, from whom nothing proceeds save what is
entirely, though not unlimitedly, good. Hence to consider the devil and
demons as aspects of unfallen-man-in-his-world would make his Creator
directly responsible for tempting him, something IV Lateran was consciously striving to avoid.
Well then, could not one just interpret Homo vero … as “Man,
however, sinned through his exercise of his own (spiritual) power of
freedom,” i.e., that he did, at his own level, just as the demons are said to
have done, where no form of antecedent suggestion or evil was present?
For man surely can sin without having the devil to tempt him, even as
St. Thomas repeatedly asserts later on.16
This position was old and well
known long before IV Lateran. Thus St. Thomas cites Origen on his side,
as also Gennadius, both well enough known to the Pope and the Council
fathers.
One could so interpret, but there is no evidence that such could be the
meaning of the text in question. After all, the Council had just made the
point that the demons did fall into sin on their own; so the language and
conceptual framework were at hand to say this of man also if the Council
had desired to say it.
Further, the Council had positive reason to avoid any mention of the
devil in connection with man’s fall. For there would be risk of seeming to
approve doctrine which, if not heretical, was at least suspect since
distorted and intertwined by the heretics with their own wild speculations
about the Fall. Many or most of the Cathars held that man (as preexisting angel) had been seduced into sinning by Satan and so punished by God (by being thrust into a material body, much in the manner of the earlier Origenist theories), while others held that Satan captured unwilling angels and thrust them into human bodies.17
Since diaboli suggestione
16 De malo 3, 5; Summa theologiae 1,114, 3c and ad 3; 1-2, 80, 4c.
17
F. Vernet, “Albigeois,” DTC 1/1, 678, 685; Y. Dossat, “Cathari,” NCE 3, 247; J. E.
Bresnahan, “Albigenses,” NCE 1, 262.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 29
could easily enough be used to evoke at least the former of these myths,
had the Council wished to say that the Fall originated solely and simply
from man himself, it could hardly have found worse language in which to
say it.
The only possibility left is to take this little sentence as an insistence
that man’s first sin had at least some root outside of either man or God,
an evil root and therefore a created one which had become evil on its
own, therefore free and personal. It was man who sinned—the Council
does not soften that fact. But he did so in response to spiritual influence
from outside himself.
6) But why should the Council care whether man sinned by his own
malice or at the devil’s suggestion, if it does not wish to deny that man
can sin on his own?
A partial answer is simply that possibility does not make fact. What
man could have done in principle, he did not do in fact. Like every
Catholic profession of faith, Firmiter offers us history (and promise),
what God and man have done (or certainly will do), and not mere
philosophical principles, however correct.
A further reason why the Council should have been so concerned with
what would otherwise seem a minor matter can be had, I think, from St.
Thomas. In the Summa theologiae 1-2, 80, 4, arg. 3, Thomas refers to a
position taken by Pope Gregory the Great:
He [God] made two creatures for knowledge of Himself, the angelic, that is, and
the human The angel being spirit only, but man both spirit and flesh —
[The devil fell irreparably because pure spirit; man, however, reparably, since
affected by the weakness of the flesh.] There is another reason why man,
when lost, ought to have been restored and the ever-proud spirit could not be
restored, because the angel fell by his own malice, but another’s [malice] prostrated man Because he [the angel] himself brought on the darkness, he should
bear without end what he did; nor should he ever receive the light of his first
state, because he lost that even though persuaded by no one.18
There are several points of interest here. First, though neither suggestio
nor its cognates appear in the entire chapter of the Moralia, Thomas
uses them five times in his brief little argument, which at least suggests
an influence of Firmiter on his own thought here.19
Second, Thomas argues, in objection to his own position, that since
none of man’s sins is irreparable, it must be that he never sins without
the suggestion of the devil. In responding to this objection, he accepts
Gregory’s point but denies the conclusion drawn from it, arguing that an
18
Moralia 4, 3 (PL 75, 642).
19
While speaking of language, one might also note the beginning phrase of Gregory’s
text and the strong resemblance, both as to words and structure, to Firmiter’s passage on
the twofold creation—the difference being largely in terms of perspective, that Gregory is
in this place concerned only with intellectual creatures.
30 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
adequate statement of the roots of human sin needs completion by
another element: “… the sin of the devil was irremediable because neither
at someone’s suggestion did he sin nor had he any proneness to sinning
caused by a preceding suggestion. Which cannot be said concerning any
sin of man”20
[my emphasis]. Given the prominence of the Moralia
among reform-minded ecclesiastics throughout the Middle Ages, and if
we note that the very next sentence of Firmiter goes on to show the
Trinity initiating the teaching of salvine truth through the saints of the
Old Testament, it seems likely that what Innocent III here proposed to
the Council was a wording which pointed at once, even in the first
mention of original sin, to the possibility of a remedy.
But not only or even principally that. Diaboli suggestione is a brilliant
retort against the Cathars, which turns against them not only Catholic
doctrine but even their own fables of the Fall. For, following the lead
given by Gregory’s other remarks, which link the possibility of repentance
to existence in the flesh, this phrase finishes the demonstration that it is
the spiritual, not the corporeal, that lies at the source of moral evil. The
difference between the sin of the demons and the sin of man, already
intimated by vero, is made explicit by saying of the demons that “they
became evil,” but of man only that “he sinned.” Then the Council takes
the matter one final step. Since the evil-doing of the demons was “on
their own,” whereas man’s was “at the suggestion of the devil,” pure
spirits were the only untempted sinners. Spiritual powers alone, not
man’s corporeality nor that of his universe, tempted him. Not only is the
material order not evil; from at least this one, most fundamental aspect,
it is further from evil than is spirit.
There is another reason also, I think, for the Council’s inserting the
phrase diaboli suggestione, one strongly stressed by Karl Rahner.21
God’s revelation to us is concerned with angels and demons not for their own
sake but insofar as they enter into human salvation-history. This means,
ultimately, that angels and demons must be seen primarily in their
relation to the mystery of Christ. Now, from the Council’s perspective,
the Fall represents the principal intervention of angehe substances into
the human world. If any connection is to be made between such powers
and the work of Christ, here is the obvious and essential one; for it is
from the devil’s success in this intervention that the concrete need for
human salvation arose and that its mode and manner were congruously
determined. All else in human history is stamped by that event, and it is
Christ who brought about its reversal and ultimate failure.
With this in mind, one can more easily understand a further mention
20
Ibid., ad 3.
21
“Angelologie,” LThK 1, 537-38; “Dämonologie,” LThKS, 146-47; “Angel,” Sacramenturn mundi 1, 29.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 31
of the devil, strangely overlooked in present-day discussion about Firmiters position concerning angels and demons. When speaking of the
resurrection of all, both good and bad, it says that “those [the reprobate]
receive with the devil unremitting punishment; and these [the elect],
with Christ eternal glory.”22
The parallelism established here between Christ and the devil is
obvious and is evidently intentional. From the context of the entire
paragraph it is clear that Christ is being considered here in his human
nature, that nature he took up into himself precisely so that he might
overcome the devil (Heb 2:14). There is no Christian dualism: the devil
is as nothing in God’s eyes and can in no way prevail against Him. But he
is, as St. Ignatius Loyola habitually described him, “the enemy of our
human nature.” So it was that God chose that he should be conquered by
a man, like ourselves in all save sin. Heaven, then, is our triumph with
him who saved us through our own nature and his; hell is our total
subjugation to that evil spirit and alien nature whom we chose, without
any necessity, to retain as our master.
3) A second group of theologians concedes at most a hypothetical
existence to angels and demons. Elements of long-gone world-views, they
once served as vehicles for revealed truth. But we now know or at least
suppose that there was never anything in the real world to which they
referred, even with all allowance made for cultural transpositions. It is
this lack of any objective referent that makes the essential difference
between this position and that of 1.2) above. Rather than force a metaphoric identification of angels and demons with God’s self-manifestations
or the powers of the psyche, etc., things which assuredly the Council was
not talking about, those urging this position consider the conciliar statement to be analogous to some such assertion as “God created all material
things without exception, including the gryphons and chimaeras.” There
is no referent for the last phrase which we would now admit to exist. Yet
the phrase still has a use and a purpose which we can accept, these thenbelieved-in creatures serving merely to exemplify the all-inclusiveness of
the assertion. So here; invisibilium, angelicam, and the rest are really
only an awkward way of saying “whatever else there might be other than
God and man and the material universe.” They constitute an antiquated
way to designate a category of beings which might or might not exist (the
Council thought, in fact, that they did; “modern man,” generally, thinks
they do not) but whose existence was not directly of concern—only that,
if they exist, they also are creatures. So also, with regard to the next
sentence, Diabolus enim … , we are told that even if “the devil and other
demons” do not exist, at least the Council’s intent (that whatever evil
DS 801, at end.
32 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
beings do exist could have become such only by their own doing) is still
preserved.
Like the metaphorical approach, this argument has difficulty in being
self-consistent. For example, Diabolus enim … could be transcribed into
“The devil and other demons, if there be any such, were created …”
without harm to the dogma that evil originated with the creature. But
would it not be strange to “firmly believe and straightforwardly confess
that… [m]an sinned at the suggestion of the devil, if there be one.” And
if not? Too much of that with which we have seen the Council to be
directly concerned is at stake here to permit us to accept such witless
ambiguity as a truth of faith solemnly professed. The metaphorical
approach might seem plausible here, but the hypothetical one collapses.
The worst aspect, however, to this nonreferential approach to dogma
is that it can be maintained only at the cost of admitting the possible
falsity of dogmatic propositions. Thus, although the last clause of the first
sentence of Firmiter is subordinate, it is so only through its having as its
subject a relative pronoun referring back to the Trinity as one single
principle of creation. The clause forms an integral statement and, if the
Persons did not in fact as one principle create all three orders of creation
as there asserted, is false.
Diabolus enim … is a separate and independent statement which
asserts directly that the devil and other demons were created by God,
etc. If, then, nothing at all in the real order exists to which the “devil and
other demons” refers, this sentence also is rendered not meaningless but
false, for what is signified by these terms was in that case not created by
God. The analogy involving gryphons, if extended here, does nothing to
help: “Gryphons were created by God as good (for man’s benefit?) but in
fact, by their own doing, became evil (hurtful to man?)” could never have
been part of any profession of faith (unless one slides unconsciously back
into a metaphorical interpretation and takes all this as having some
obscure referent). Such a statement would, in the context of the nine
heavens, not be equivalent to “God created all nine of the heavens” but
to “God created nine solid, crystalline spheres.” So also, if man sinned
other than by the suggestion of the devil, the next sentence too is falsified.
The position we are arguing against, then, requires the simultaneous
falsity of three directly asserted, solemnly professed propositions. Can
such a position be an acceptable interpretation of a profession of faith of
the Universal Church?
We shall shortly say more about the difference between professions of
faith and other solemn definitions. I do not think, however, that any
examples of such vacuous language and false assertion as are called for
by the above interpretation of Firmiter can be found elsewhere in either
type of clarification of the content of the faith. Even a convinced poly-
ANGELS AND DEMONS 33
genist, for example, will not reject Trent’s “first man Adam” (DS 1511)
as having no referent whatever, even though he may choose to “translate”
it into many human yet not kindred individuals. And though some
conciliar statements may seem to us conceptually awkward and but
poorly expressive of the truth they seek to set forth, e.g., some of Trent’s
canons on the sacrament of penance, none can be found that are simply
false, even where they might still serve some other function in their
context. Since the burden of proof lies on those who espouse this position,
we may wait for them to bring forward any such falsely true assertions
from a profession of faith of the Universal Church or from her other
solemn definitions.23
We shall discuss later whether it is theoretically possible for an ecumenical council solemnly to define propositions that are false when
translated into any and every cultural framework but that are absorbed
by the Council’s intent into some general truth contained by their
definitory context; more, whether a profession of faith can contain such
false assertions. Here we note only that a mere assumption of this
possibility is of no theological value. The point requires proof; to my
knowledge, none has been offered.
Further, let us look more closely at the sort of analogy already mentioned: that angels are used, only as gryphons might be, from a scruple
for completeness, that a Council might make a definition in terms of
gryphons and all other material beings that would not be the less true for
being false, and that this is just what has occurred here concerning the
angels and any other pure spirits. Perhaps. But what does the Council
actually say? “[God] … formed … the spiritual world … that is, the
angelic world ” The suggested analog would run, “God formed … the
animal world… that is, the world of gryphons.” May we be excused for
finding this unconvincing? Would it help, to shift the example slightly, to
say that God created trolls to guard the precious metals in the mountains
and that He created them good but they became bad on their own and
have led men to covet their treasures and so to sin?
This last example brings forward another aspect of the decree. Were
angels and demons merely prototypical examples of an unreal spirit
world, they would still have been only two varieties among many. Angels
and demons were not, for most Christians of that day, the only invisible,
incorporeal, or spiritual beings. Sprites of many kinds were widely
thought to be active in human affairs. It is scarcely plausible that the
Council, were it concerned in scrupulous fashion with only the universality of God’s creation and the creaturely origins of evil, would have failed
to give any hint that its teaching extended as well to trolls, fairies,
23
For details of the distinction between a profession of faith and other solemn definitions,
cf. II, 1 below.
34 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
korrigans, elves, duendes, imps, gnomes, poultergeists, goblins, ghosts,
banshees, and their kin. Yet current ideas about the activities of all these
were seriously corruptive of practical trust and faith in God. Were the
Council as scrupulous as supposed, would it not at least have spoken of
“spiritual beings, such as angels” or “including angels” or “especially the
angels”? Would it not have indicated that all evil creatures, “especially
the devil …” or “before all others, the devil …,” became evil by their
own choice? The fact that it did nothing of the sort shows, from still
another vantage point, that instead of limiting itself to asserting a merely
hypothetical, abstract principle concerning the genesis of moral evil, the
Council was, at least implicitly, separating the existential status of the
devil and other demons from that of all kinds of sprites.24
4) The majority of theologians today who have seriously considered
the matter acknowledge angehe and demonic existence to be a matter of
faith. But they see in Firmiter not a definition of this but, rather, one
more particularly strong attestation to the de fide ordinary teaching of
the Church of all centuries. They raise no question, then, about the
referents of the terms, which are acknowledged to be real, but only about
the precise range of the defining intent of the Council. Their concern is
with theological methodology rather than the content of the faith.
Only a point of doctrine, they argue, which is explicitly stated and
expressly set down by the Council, following due reflection on that precise
point, can be regarded as part of what it intended to define. But Firmiter
does not state, “Angels and demons exist.” If it does not expressly affirm
their existence, what right would we have to stretch the definition to
include this point or bind a Catholic’s conscience to acceptance under
pain of “shipwreck as to faith”?
But the question is poorly conceived; we are not concerned with
stretching what the Council said but understanding it. When I Nicaea
declares, “We believe in one God, Father, almighty,” is it defining the
existence of God? No Council has stated, “Jesus Christ exists.” Need we
24
Though the matter would require a deeper investigation into the thought of Innocent
III and the background of Firmiter, it seems not unreasonable to see this section as implying
that all the spirits directly created by God (as distinguished from the human soul at death)
are angels. The whole world of sprites would thereby be excluded from Christian faith and
relegated to superstition. This interpretation is not required by the text, since, as we shall
see, the heresies of the time offered sufficient grounds for these phrases. Yet an interpretation seeing Firmiter as an implicit rejection of the superstitions prevalent in the Middle
Ages (and often since) should not be put aside, I think, without a good deal more careful
work on the genesis of the decree than has been done. Finally, suppose that we find no
trace or hint of such an intent. These phrases would then bear witness to a genuine
presupposition of the sort being suggested by Darlapp et al: the Christian conviction that
beliefs in sprites are but superstitions, in no way worthy to be mentioned alongside Catholic
faith concerning angels and demons.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 35
believe that He does or, from another perspective, have we the Church’s
guarantee that He does? Most Catholics would, I think, instinctively
answer a firm yes to these questions and would regard it as the worst sort
of legalism or quibbling to say that these things have not been directly
defined (i.e., proposed by the Church as divinely revealed, hence to be
believed) even though the formal and express statements of existence
have never been made.
The most basic reason for such an answer is clear. The primary concern
of a creed or profession of faith is to make the faith publicly recognizable—hence its name symbolon.25 The common faith, not one’s philosophy, not one’s theology, is what is professed. Assertions of existence
might be called for by a philosopher, even a theologian; faith has no need
of them, since it speaks of nothing but what is real.
To put the matter more systematically, the presuppositions made by
a profession of faith as to the existence of the things about which it
intends to make true assertions differ, precisely as existential, from all
other presuppositions—for example, those relating to language, to conceptual framework, to cultural patterns, and to theological systems.
Existential presuppositions, unlike these latter, cannot be accorded ally
different authority than expressly formulated points, since the reality
spoken of by these is identically that which is presupposed. If any
existential presupposition is not true, then, whatever be the case concerning the language employed or conceptual background, the expressly
declared assertion is by that very fact not true. Did God not exist, we
could not believe in Him in any Christian sense. Since, however, the
converse is not true (since assertions might be false without implying the
nonexistence of their subject), existential presuppositions are, if one may
so speak, more certain and more essential elements of the faith intended
by a profession than were they expressly defined. It is mere juridicism or
legalism to see the express wording of a profession of faith as more
significant that the substance of the faith itself.
For the same reason, we have used the existential reference, assumed
or implied, of the terms “angel,” “devil,” and “demons” as our primary
criterion in categorizing the types of argument; for the reality spoken
about is as it is, independently of language, conceptual frameworks,
cultural patterns, and all the rest save in cases of self-reference, which
are not in question here. Faith transcends all of these, though not
ordinarily able to exist without them, precisely by giving us direct access
to the reality itself. It is in the light of this contact with the divine reality
that the Church can judge all propositions made about it.
Linguistically, there is a problem in that we have in English no
correlative to “expressly” and its cognates. To speak of what is “impressly
25
Cf. de Lubac, La foi 392-98.
36 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
defined” would introduce an obscure and awkward neologism. As a result,
much has been written concerning “implicit definition.” But this can
easily distort the matter; for the relation to existence of which we are
speaking is not one discovered by theological argument, by rational
implication, or even by the strictest logical entailment. Rather, the
existential aspect, something like a Kantian a priori, is that without
which the act of faith that is expressly indicated not only cannot be
conceived but cannot take place at all in the human person. Though not
expressed directly by the words used, it is already present, and is manifested, if need be, by a sort of unfolding; hence not “implicit definition”
but “explicit though not express.”
Thus, at the beginning of Firmiter, IV Lateran both explicitly and
expressly defines the unicity of God, but defines His existence only
explicitly.26
The decree defines expressly and explicitly the relations of
the divine Persons, only explicitly that there are such Persons; expressly
and explicitly the two natures and activities of Christ among us, only
explicitly His earthly existence; expressly and explicitly the spiritual
nature and creaturely status of angels (and demons), only explicitly their
existence.
5) With respect to any one of the forms of argument we have been
considering, it might be objected mutatis mutandis that we have misconstrued the Council’s intent by neglecting the presently popular distinction
between the content of a profession of faith (or, indeed, of the faith itself),
which is regarded as infallibly proclaimed thereby, and its form or mode
of expression, which, as culturally conditioned and soon outdated, is not
binding on the Catholic conscience.27
The most obvious difficulty with such a distinction here is that IV
Lateran knew nothing about it in any way useful to those insisting upon
it with regard to angels. Further, such a distinction would be useless for
their purpose unless they also show that what Firmiter says of good
angels and bad is, in fact, solely a part of the form and not at all a part of
26
It will not do to say that, even if God did not exist, it would still be true that the
Christian concept of God implies His unicity, hence that declaration of His unicity gives no
grounds of itself for asserting His existence; for, did He not exist, faith in His unicity would
be erroneous. Professions of faith are solely existential and factual; conceptual elaboration
is of no direct concern to them.
27
Darlapp indeed brings up this question, not apropos of Firmiter; however, but of the
Scriptures, suggesting thereby that a certain modern approach would find angels and
demons there primarily as part of the literary and conceptual forms of thought of the sacred
authors but not, or at least only rarely and in very limited measure, part of its content.
More detailed arguments of this sort can be found throughout van der Hart, The Theology,
Haag, Teufelsglaube, and Westermann, God’s Angels. We leave this aspect of the problem
to biblical theologians; there is no doubt that Innocent III and the Council fathers regarded
angels and demons as part of the revealed content of the Scriptures.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 37
its content, that only their two endlessly repeated facts, God’s unique
and universal creativity and the creaturely origins of evil, can be considered content. Though so often stated or implied, to my knowledge no
serious effort has been made to show it to be the case. In my judgment,
it cannot be shown. As the arguments in Section I have already manifested and as those in Section II will do more fully, the Council was
directly and profoundly concerned with true doctrine concerning angels
and demons as such, and not merely as being representative of the whole
furniture of the world.
II
We turn now to the final type of argument used against the possibility
that IV Lateran defined the existence of angels and demons. The hermeneutic principle upon which all here turns is succinctly stated by C.
Mayer: “any dogmatic definition ought not to be extended beyond the
scope of the error it intends to condemn.”28
The Cathars aimed at by
Firmiter did not, however, deny the existence of angels and demons but,
if anything, exaggerated their importance. The Council surely could not
here be defining something concerning which the heretics held the same
doctrine as the Church. Hence, it is argued, whatever it is intending in
this passage, IV Lateran is not here defining as a point of faith the
existence of angels and demons.
1) The hermeneutic principle just enunciated might be something
useful for ecumenical councils to think about before drawing up their
definitions. As a principle for interpreting what a Council has in fact
done, it is seriously inadequate.
First, what is defined by a form of conciliar words is whatever truth
the Council intended to define by their means. We are, admittedly,
sometimes ignorant of what a Council intended—in which case the words
they bequeath to us may give little light or serve only to point some
general direction or orientation. It is, then, as an aid in descrying the
Council’s intent that one scrutinizes, as well as one can, the errors the
Council sought to condemn in the form in which it perceived them.29
Thus, to use the above principle, one must show that the Council in
question had, at least implicitly, adopted it. Yet none of these authors
has attempted to show that either Innocent III or IV Lateran itself was
using this principle in Firmiter.
28
Mayer, “Speak” 10; cf. also Semmelroth, “Abschied” 64-66.
29
It should be clear that the actual doctrines of the heretics and the exact sense they
gave them are, in this context, of secondary importance; it is what the Council took them
to be that matters in its teachings. Hence a Council’s perception of false doctrine often has
to be inferred as much from the conciliar decrees as from the writings or teachers
condemned.
38 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
Second, such a showing is needed since prima facie this principle has
little intrinsic plausibility in our present context. It may be useful for
interpreting such express condemnations of false teaching as the canons
of Trent or I Vatican; but Firmiter condemns nothing whatever.
The theologians who urge this principle here have failed to distinguish
between the different types of doctrinal decree. For our purposes, we
need differentiate only between creeds and professions of faith on the
one hand and solemn definitions of more general nature (the several sorts
of which we need not concern ourselves with here) on the other.
The great difference between the creeds and the professions of faith is
the acceptance of the former into liturgical use, making them thus a part
of the worship offered by the entire Church. What is common to them
both is that, usually on occasion of some heresy, they enunciate positively
the fundamental faith of the Church. They do so, moreover, in such
manner that all their parts bear witness to the content of the faith.30
The contrast between either creed or profession of faith and other
statements which contain solemn definitions is generally evident. Their
structures and literary styles differ strikingly. Many things are included
in these latter doctrinal decrees which are not themselves defined. Some
are fairly extensive, discursive presentations of doctrine, containing many
elements which clearly do not have, nor were intended by the Councils
themselves to have, the same weight. Others, the canons, are very dense,
tightly-worded condemnations of specific people or doctrines. The common principles of interpretation (e.g., the sense given a citation of Scripture is not defined unless expressly declared to be so; matters
contained in subordinate clauses are not, as such, defined; the principle
here under discussion: the exact bearing of a condemnation can only be
fully determined by discovering the exact notion the Council had of the
error condemned thereby) are all needed for proper interpretation of
these statements. The points we developed in Section I, 4 above are
pertinent here also, concerning the kinds of presuppositions present in
conciliar decrees and what is or is not expressly defined.
Now, the hermeneutical principle of Mayer, Semmelroth, et ai, if
applied to professions of faith or creeds, would radically falsify the nature
of these acts of faith; for it would reduce declarations of the faith through
which we live to statements of mere reaction to evil, to affirmations of
only what heretics have already denied. It would forbid councils to set
forth, coherently and in some fulness, the positive content of the faith.
But surely no one would wish to say that reflex awareness of the faith
can be had solely as a response to heresy, true though it may be that
theology often flourishes in such conflicts. Moreover, if one cannot go
beyond the scope of an error, often the error cannot be shown for what
30
Cf., e.g., Lehmann, “Der Teufel” 81.
ANGELS AND DEMONS 39
it is, for theological errors are largely the result of overlooking or refusing
part of the data of faith; still less can the opposed truth be stated.
Finally, this principle is flatly contradicted by the opening lines of the
Creed of I Nicaea: “We believe in one God, Father, almighty, maker of all
things, visible and invisible,” which no Arian would have dreamed of
denying. Indeed, the greater part of this creed consists of dogmas which
Arians also held as central to their belief.31
The Creed of I Constantinople
and, so far as I can tell, every creed and profession of faith the councils
have yet proposed for our instruction has affirmed as dogmas doctrines
that the heretics of the time did not reject. Evidently, then, the fact that
a point of doctrine, mentioned in a profession of faith, is held in common
with heretics offers no grounds whatever for excluding it from the defining
intent of a council.
2) To apply all this to our present case, let us look for a moment at the
second constitution approved by IV Lateran, Damnamus (DS 803-8),
directed against the errors of Joachim of Flora concerning the Trinity.
We see that its primary concern is with a theological issue that was in
principle of great importance for the faith but had at the time no great
influence on the lives of Catholics outside the theological faculties of the
University of Paris and of a few others. Abbot Joachim’s equally important, equally false, and equally plausible doctrine linking the three ages
of the history of salvation with the three Persons of the Trinity was even
then of far greater practical consequence than his verging logically on
tritheism through his rejection of Peter Lombard’s proposition on the
Trinity. Damnamus, in fact, reflected Innocent Ill’s own theological
preoccupations and interests32
and was directed principally to theologians. Thus only could it afford to set aside in a manner so casual as to be almost flip the far more radical subversion of faith represented by
Amaury de Bène’s pantheism.
For all that, Damnamus contains major and solemn definitions of
matters lying at the very heart of the faith. But in style it is discursive.
It refers to the history of the dispute; it explains, marshals arguments,
seeks to persuade, even in its most solemn portions. Evidently its synopsis
of Abbot Joachim’s complaints against Peter Lombard is not defined
doctrine, nor are its remarks about him and his monastery. Further—and
this is the point rightly made by Mayer—even the portions of the text
which clearly constitute the heart of the decree can only be rightly
interpreted in the light of the doctrine being condemned. Thus, “in God
there is only a Trinity, not a quaternity”33
could not legitimately be used

311. Ortiz de Urbina, S.J., Nicée et Constantinople (Paris: Editions de lOrante, 1963) 72-
312. 
     32
     M. Maccarrone, “IIIV Concilio Lateranense,” Divinità* 5 (1961) 270-98, at 288.
     ^DSetM.
     40 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
     against the quaternity involved in St. Thomas’ doctrine of four real
     relations in God (ST 1, 28, 4), but only against that very different
     quaternity spoken of by Joachim.
     Yet even here it is not possible to restrict the scope of the Council’s
     definitions by limiting its deliberate intent merely to negating what Abbot
     Joachim said. In its first paragraph, indeed, Damnamus details at some
     length the doctrines it is condemning. The following paragraph gives the
     Council’s response in positive form, making Peter Lombard’s phrases its
     own. The third paragraph, however, sets forth and deepens the Church’s
     teaching concerning the true meaning of the consubstantiality of the
     Persons, without further consideration of the Abbot’s errors on the
     matter. And the great principle of the fourth paragraph concerning God’s
     complete transcendence of His creatures far exceeds the scope of
     Joachim’s thought, while at the same time pointing to the deepest roots
     of his mistakes.
     Firmiter, on the other hand, is a profession of faith. Its contrast to
     Damnamus is striking. Firmiter gives no arguments whatever and no
     explanations; it does not mention any adversaries or indicate the doctrines
     it is rejecting; it offers neither persuasion nor motivation. Its sole function
     is to profess the true faith, albeit with special emphasis and greater
     elaboration of what in the Church’s faith, as we know from other sources,
     was misunderstood and was currently an occasion of error and heretical
     misinterpretation.
     Its closest parallels are to be found in the Apostle’s Creed and in those
     of I Nicaea and I Constantinople.34
     Indeed, Bernard of Parma, who had
     been in his teens at the time of the Council and who a generation later
     wrote the gloss upon the Gregorian Decretals which was to become the
     Glossa ordinaria, called Firmiter a fourth creed.35
     Similar language
     occurs in a fuller, more carefully qualified statement from the same
     author’s Casus longi.36 As noted by the marginal annotator of the printed
     text of 1612, the so-called Athanasian Creed or Quicumque (mentioned
     34
     Maccarrone, “Ή IV Concilio” 286. R. Foreville, Latran I, II, III, et Latran IV (Paris:
     Editions de l’Orante, 1965) 275-82; J. Alberigo et al, Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta
     (3rd ed.; Bologna: Istituto per le Scienze Religiose, 1973) 228; The Christian Faith in the
     Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church (ed. J. Neuner, S.J., and J. Dupuis, S.J.; 1st
     U.S. ed. corrected, Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1975) 15.
     35
     “Istud potest appellari quartum symbolum: et ita sunt modo quatuor, sicut quatuor
     Evangelistae” (Bernardus Parmensis, Glossa ordinaria on X, 1, 1 rubr., in Decretales^
     Gregorii IX [Paris, 1612], to be found in col. 6, A. lines 11-13). Maccarrone, “Π IV Concilio”
     287, followed by Foreville, Latran 275, attributed this text to Johannes Teutonicus, a
     canonist already active and well known at the time of IV Lateran. The correct attribution
     was graciously provided by Stephan G. Kuttner (private communications).
     36
     “Istud autem concilium posset appellari quartum symbolum, in quo illud, quod de fide
     catholica, et de summa Trinitate in praedictis concilile et symbolis continetur, confirmatur,
     et repetitur” (Decretales, ibid, C, lines 6-19).
     ANGELS AND DEMONS 41
     in both passages of Bernard as the third creed, following the Apostle’s
     Creed and that of I Constantinople, which latter Bernard designates as
     the Nicene Creed) tends toward the explanatory and hence is less properly
     called a symbolum (creed) than a rule (of faith).37
     But he makes no such
     reservation about Firmiter. Neither is there any doubt that in structure
     it is much closer to the Creed of I Constantinople than to Quicumque.38
     It should be noted, however, that though Bernard’s gloss is careful to
     mention the liturgical use of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, he
     indicates no liturgical use made of Firmiter.39
     All this is confirmed by the style of Firmiter. “We firmly believe and
     straightforwardly confess that …” are the only words not themselves
     expressive of some point of faith, just as in the Nicene Creed and its
     Constantinopolitan amplification the only such words are the initial “We
     believe in.” The rest is sober, clear, nuanced in a direct, slightly repetitive
     manner, like the earlier creeds. There are no superfluities, no looseness
     of expression. Further, the topics are arranged in strict parallelism with
     the earlier creeds.40
     In brief, there is no slightest indication that anything
     there is not intended by the Council to express some basic aspect or
     element of the Catholic faith.
     Worse yet for the argument of Mayer et al., it is not hard to show, not
     only in Damnamus but even elsewhere in Firmiter, that IV Lateran put
     into its profession matters of faith that, while related to disputed matters,
     were not themselves in dispute, even as I Nicaea and I Constantinople
     did before it. For example, the statements in Firmiter on the processions
     and relations in the Trinity were not in dispute (apart from the pariter
     ab utroque, which supported the Filioque against its rejection by the
     Greeks). A careful reading of Damnamus (DS 803) indicates that Joachim
     had not denied the processions or relations as such, little as he understood
     of their import. As to the Cathars, they held that the Son and Spirit were
     angels, mere creatures of the Father—against whom an assertion of their
     37
     Decretales, ibid., marginal note 5, opposite text of col. 6, C, line 5.
     3 8
     The chief reason why Firmiter was not set into exact parallelism with the first two was
     undoubtedly Innocent Ill’s intense interest in reunion with the Greek Church and in putting
     a final end to the schism (Maccarrone, “Π IV Concilio” 274-75; Foreville, Latran 254-57,
     275, 280). He knew well that the addition of even the one word Filioque to the text of the
     Creed of I Constantinople, even though the doctrine thereby expressed was acceptable to
     the Greeks when they understood it, was a major bone of contention. The Greeks held
     firmly to the decree of Ephesus (DS 265) and conceded no right to add anything to the
     early creeds save by a council indisputably ecumenical—and at IV Lateran the Greek
     churches, although invited, were not represented. Indeed, as present Greek-Anglican
     relations show in connection with recent actions on the Book of Common Prayer, the
     matter is still active and sore.
     39
     It would be a matter of some importance to know with certainty if at IV Lateran itself
     any liturgical use was made of it.
     4 0
     Cf. Foreville, Latran 275-83.
     42 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
     divinity was required but for whom statements concerning the processions are, strictly speaking, superfluous. The Waldenses also, touched in
     two places by Firmiter,41
     seem to have had no heretical doctrine as to the
     processions and relations (cf., e.g., DS 790-91).
     3) Even if one accepts the overly restrictive conditions placed by Mayer
     et al, however, it is not hard to show that the Council was declaring
     directly the existence of angels and demons. In the years preceding IV
     Lateran, Albigensianism and the other forms of Catharism constituted
     an almost continuous range of both strict and mitigated forms of dualistic
     heresy. What has been much less widely recognized is that almost all
     their false teachings were expressed as false doctrines concerning angels
     or demons.42
     Thus the strict dualists rejected monotheism, declaring Satan to be the
     uncreated principle of evil and the creator of matter in all its forms,
     though apparently inferior in power to the good God, who created only
     spiritual beings. All the groups seem to have rejected the Trinity, making
     the Word and the Holy Spirit into created pure spirits. Most held that
     men at their creation were themselves angels in heaven.43
     According to
     one school, they were thrust into this material and evil body, made by
     the devil, only as a punishment for their initial rebellion against the good
     God; another school made the fall of these angels into human estate the
     direct doing of Satan, who invaded heaven, conquered Michael, and
     captured one third of the angels, whom he then thrust into human or
     animal bodies. The God of the Old Testament was the devil; the God of
     the New Testament alone is the good God. The Incarnation was rejected:
     the human bodies of Jesus and Mary (also an angel) were mere appearances and not real matter at all. The resurrection of the body was denied:
     whoever is imperfect at death must be reincarnated repeatedly until
     made perfect; after that he rises from the dead as pure spirit, an angel
     once again. John the Baptist was a demon, John the Evangelist an angel.
     Moreover, it is not true, as a general proposition, that Catholics and
     Albigenses held the same doctrine as to the existence of angels and
     demons. Both groups, indeed, used the words “angels” and “demons,”
     but they gave them, in important ways, quite different meanings. Most
     strikingly, of course, the strict dualists meant by “the devil” a second
     god, rival to the good God, infinite in evil, and creator of matter and all
     41
     Vernet, “Albigeois,” DTC 1/1, 684-85.
     42
     J. Duvernoy, Le catharisme: La religion des cathares (Toulouse: Privat, 1976) 57-76;
     Α. Borst, Die Katharer (Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1953) 143-55, 162-73; “Katharer,” LThK
     6 (1961) 59; Foreville, Latran 283-85; Bresnahan, “Albigenses,” NCE 1, 262; Dossat,
     “Cathari,” NCE 3, 246-47.
     43
     The others held what might be called “angehe traducianism,” making Adam an angel,
     from whom all subsequent human souls were stepwise propagated (Duvernoy, Le catharisme 114-15).
     ANGELS AND DEMONS 43
     things insofar as material. Hence the Albigenses’ assertion “The devil
     exists” does not embody the same judgment as the Catholics’ assertion
     “The devil exists.” A similar divergence of meaning can be found between
     the orthodox idea of a human or even animal soul and the heretics’ notion
     of souls: angels animating human or animal bodies.
     Nor should one forget that the ever-growing disputes concerning “the
     problem of universale” had for a century been spawning heresies involving
     angels. There were the Platonists, who regarded the angels as eternally
     subsistent, universal ideas. At the opposite extreme, the nominalist
     Roscellinus saw the Trinity as but the consortium of three angels.44
     There
     were the doctrines of Amaury de Bène, who had angels propagating their
     kind45
     and thought the devil is in God and that God gives him approval.46
     And there were the nascent problems generated by the Aristotelian
     doctrines of the Averroists and others concerning “separated substances”
     and their role in human cognition, with the consequent denial of the
     immortality of the individual human person.47
     This by no means exhausts
     the heresies of the day concerning angels and demons but includes most,
     I think, of those known to the Council.
     A direct response to such varied, ever-changing, and fluid doctrinal
     error was probably impossible, certainly impracticable. Hence the Council, following the lead of Innocent III, adopted the strongly positive policy
     of stating in balanced manner the Catholic faith as to all areas in dispute.
     What is said, then, of angels and demons intentionally and directly asserts
     articles of Catholic faith, set up against the entire rash of distortions and
     perversions of doctrine current at the time.
     Mayer offers as a supporting argument that “No theologian has ever
     claimed that Lateran IV intended to define the existence of the world of
     material things as a dogma of the faith .. .,”48
     inferring therefrom that
     neither does it intend to define the existence of a world of spiritual things.
     There are, however, several weaknesses in this argument.
     The parallelism is weak, at best. For material things are directly
     experienced by us through our natural powers, requiring no help of grace
     whatever. But to know that angels and demons, such as Christianity
     conceives them, exist is a matter of faith alone. Even for St. Thomas,
     44
     Cf. Anselm, Opera omnia 2,1-35 (Ep. de inc. Verbi 1-2); Tavard, Die Engel 62.
     45
     G. C. Capelle, Amaury de Bène (Paris: Vrin, 1932) 40-41.
     46
     Capelle, Amaury 91. At about the same level of thought was David of Dinant’s recently
     notorious teaching that God is the materia prima of the entire universe—one additional
     though minor reason for the Council’s wishing to define the existence of spiritual creatures;
     cf. L. Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970) 131.
     47
     It seems that this was not to become prominent until about 1250, at least in Paris,
     according to the testimony of Roger Bacon (cf., however, Foreville, Latran 283, 285).
     48
     Mayer, “Speak” 11. As to the point of fact, P. Schoonenberg does seem to claim this;
     cf. Convenant and Creation (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1968) 76.
     44 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
     reason can show the existence of pure spirits other than God not by
     apodictic proof but by convenientia—suitability.49
     Then, denial by the heretics of the existence of certain material beings
     constituted a considerable portion of their heresy: the denial of the
     material reality of the human bodies of our Lord and his mother, with
     the consequent denial of his redeeming death; the denial of the existence
     of human bodies when man was first created; the denial of the resurrection of the body and of the body’s sharing in glory or punishment. All
     material beings were denied existence by the followers of Amaury de
     Bène, as a result of their spiritualistic monism. According, then, to the
     principle for interpreting conciliar decrees adduced by Mayer, to define
     the existence of material things over against that of spiritual things was
     perfectly in order. In my judgment, Firmiter does intend to define that
     the existence of some material beings, as well as of spiritual ones, is given
     in revelation. Further, by defining God to be the creator of the sensible
     world, against the majority of Cathars who held that it was created by
     the devil, the Council, as seen above, defined explicitly, though not
     expressly, its existence.
     4) Before we conclude, some comment ought to be made on I Vatican’s
     often misunderstood reiteration of IV Lateran (DS 3002). I Vatican
     mentions angels in a direct and unmodified quotation of the last clause
     in the first sentence of Firmiter, beginning with “simul ab initio temporis.” One might suppose that the fathers of I Vatican intended to
     charge these phrases about angels with fuller meaning than did their
     source; for there had been great theological development of Catholic
     doctrine concerning angels during the intervening 650 years, especially at
     the hands of St. Thomas. Moreover, though the Cathars seemed to have
     vanished without a trace, the existence of angels and demons was already
     under attack in the Catholic circles infected with rationalism about whom
     the Council was concerned.
     Yet I have been unable to turn up from acta50
     any sign of thought or
     concern about angels in themselves. The Council fathers restrict themselves to asserting the radical difference between God and even the most
     spiritual of creatures. Their fight is with the pantheisms, monisms, and
     emanationisms of their day (cf. DS 3024-25). Darlapp’s line of argument
     fits very well here. Angels are brought in precisely in order to be complete,
     not indeed in listing the creatures of the world but in eliminating all the
     forms of emanationism. Canons 1, 4, and 5 of this chapter speak of
     invisible or spiritual beings, but only as examples to illustrate the doctrinal points being made and to give them universal extension.
     49
     Cf. Rahner, “Angelologie,” 536-38; “Dämonologie.” Also Schmaus, God 208-14.
     50
     Collectif) Lacensis 7, esp. 69-78, 507-18, 1628-36.
     ANGELS AND DEMONS 45
     Haag,51
     Gonzalez,52
     and others suggest that I Vatican is making a
     significant change in Church teaching by its omission of the next two
     sentences of Firmiter concerning the devil and other demons. Such a
     suggestion can be seen only as wishful thinking. In the context of creation
     versus pantheistic emanation, emergence, and the like, explicit mention
     of the devil, of the Fall, even of salvation was not seen as crucial; the
     battle was elsewhere. In any case, due to the at least temporary victory
     of Thomas’ angelology within the Church, “angel” stood, even more
     easily than at IV Lateran, for both good angels and bad.
     In conclusion, then, I think I have shown that the methodological
     difficulty which has prevented Darlapp and those who stand with him
     from seeing in Firmiter a de fide declaration of the existence of angels
     and demons is inapplicable and out of accord with both actual text and
     context of the constitution itself, even though useful enough with regard
     both to other aspects of Firmiter and to the angels in I Vatican’s
     quotation therefrom. A fortiori, doubts or denials that the existence of
     angels and demons is an article of Catholic faith have been shown to be
     without serious grounding. There is no way to restrict the defining intent
     of IV Lateran to merely the universality and unicity of God’s creative
     activity and the creaturely origins of evil. The doctrines of the heretics of
     the time were couched primarily in terms of false teachings about angels
     and demons, so that Firmiter was indeed speaking against unacceptable
     doctrine in what it said of these. The arguments utilizing other senses of
     “presupposition” than that of Darlapp would either destroy Catholic
     doctrine in every area or prove inadequate to deal with the actual text of
     Firmiter.
     Finally, I should like to draw attention to the fact pointed out by
     Foreville53
     and by L. Hödl,54
     that serious theological work on the teaching
     of Firmiter has hardly started. And the historical research that would be
     indispensable for understanding with some fulness the exact mind of the
     Council seems to have centered on everything save the theological
     background of Innocent III and the Council fathers, their perceptions of
     the theological situation of their times, and the immediate influences
     brought to bear on the drafting of Firmiter.
     51
     Teufelsglaube 131-32.
     52
     “Dios y el diablo” 294.
     53
     Latran 418.
     54
     Die Geschichte der scholastischen Literatur und der Theologie der Schlüsselgewalt
     1 (Münster, 1959) 321, cited in Maccarrone, “ΠIV Concilio” 270, η. 1.

file:///C:/Users/vanhoveb/Downloads/angels%20and%20demons%20%20clean%20copy.pdf

“Angels and Demons: The Teaching of IV Lateran”

Paul M. Quay, SJ

Theological Studies

MARCH 1981

VOL 42, NO. 1

Peter Schweizer on the China Threat

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 ‘Beijing Wants to Reconstitute Life on the Planet and the US’: Peter Schweizer on the China Threat

https://www.theepochtimes.com/beijing-wants-to-reconstitute-life-on-the-planet-and-the-us-peter-schweizer-on-the-china-threat_4363156.html?utm_source=ref_share&utm_campaign=cw-cc

TIFFANY MEIER

In this special episode, we sat down with Peter Schweizer, author of “Red-Handed” and president of the Government Accountability Institute. He touches on the Chinese regime’s strategy to buy off American elites to help Beijing get ahead—how that reaches from the top of the political sphere to big names on Wall Street and in business, and even higher education.

Schweizer said, “From Beijing’s perspective, they don’t care if you’re a Democrat or a Republican, they are happy to strike this kind of bargain. And what they’re looking for is individuals that will help them on the big issues that matter most to them, which is access to Western technology, access to Western capital markets.”

And in the second half, we hear from James Carafano, vice president of the Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation. He gives insight into what China is getting out of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Carafano also offered insight into ways to counter the regime. He said, “If you want to counter Chinese activity that is dangerous, destabilizing, you need a strong economy and you need to be able to defend your interests. The other side of that … is we are free societies. We’re never going to follow a model that blocks the intrusion or malicious activity by authoritarian actors.”

St. Columba’s Cathedral, Oban, Diocese of Argyll and the Isles (Scotland)

St. Columba’s Cathedral, Oban

St. Columba’s Cathedral, Oban

Sunday Masses: Vigil (Sat) 6:00 pm.; 10:30 am.
Holyday of Obligation: 10:00 am.; 7:00 pm.
Daily Mass: 10:00 am.
Administrator: Rev Mgr James L. Canon MacNeil
Phone: 01631 562123

Email: oban@rcdai.org.uk

Scotland

Coffee and Heart Care

https://www.msn.com/en-us/health/nutrition/coffee-could-benefit-your-heart-and-help-you-live-longer/ar-AAVuQMR?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=750329a4129e42c7884e44cba5ccdf9b

The US Army’s Green Berets quietly helped tilt the battlefield a little bit more toward Ukraine

Michael Lee 

© Provided by FOX News

The U.S. Army’s Special Forces, better known as Green Berets, have had a deep impact on Ukraine’s fight to defend itself from a Russian invasion, despite not being directly involved in the conflict.

“Ukraine was taken very seriously by Special Forces,” retired Green Beret Sergeant Major Martin Moore told Fox News Digital. 

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, a move that faced minimal resistance, the Ukrainian military began an effort to modernize its forces to prepare for possible further Russian incursions into the country. The U.S. military also quickly stepped in to help, with the Army’s Green Berets, taking on a critical role in training Ukrainian forces.

“They immediately set upon a great effort to protect to Ukraine, to provide training,” Moore said. “There’s nobody better at training than Green Berets. These are people that can teach.”

While elite military units such as the Navy SEAL teams garner widespread attention, the Army’s Green Berets are fanned out across the world helping Army’s prepare for wars similar to the one now being fought in Ukraine. This work is typically done quietly, something Moore said Green Berets prefer.

“They do something different,” Moore said. “They go where nobody else is and find out what is possible.”

Moore said Green Berets are a “force multiplier,” improving the combat capability of the international forces they work with. He stressed that they are not about “raids and ambushes,” but about having an “unparalleled understanding of the place” they are operating. 

Green Berets are required to learn a foreign language as part of their training and are constantly trained in the political, economic and cultural complexities of the regions in which they are assigned to operate. This unique skill set allows them to partner with foreign forces for training and at times to fight alongside them.

Those skills have been put to use in Ukraine since 2014, with Green Berets and members of the Army’s National Guard advising and training Ukrainian forces at Yavoriv Combat Training Center in western Ukraine. It’s the same facility Russia attacked with rockets on March 13, killing 35. The Americans had already left,  vacating the facility and moving troops deployed there to Germany in February. 

Part of the job Green Berets did at Yavoriv was to train their Ukrainian counterparts to set up militia units that could wage guerrilla warfare against an invading force. The Ukrainian military can now put those lessons to use, with the government actively encouraging its citizens to join the fight against Russian forces.

But the work Green Berets are doing in Europe hasn’t stopped, with forces still stationed in Europe helping prepare partner countries for the possibility of a Russian invasion further into Europe. Such a move would be a mistake for Russia, Moore told Fox News Digital, arguing that the invasion of Ukraine has already gone poorly in part because of U.S. assistance, and a further move into NATO territory would go even worse.

“Russia has a horrible thing waiting for them if they want to push this further,” Moore said.

Pray for Ukraine

 

Pray for Ukraine

Bishop Thomas Daly: ‘School Choice Is Coming to America’ (Season 3 — Ep. 1)

Bishop Thomas Daly of Spokane, Washington, says, ‘We need as many kids in Catholic schools as possible’ — but they have to teach the faith.

Catholic schools are more necessary than ever at a time when children are being force-fed progressive ideologies — but parents are struggling to afford the tuition, and some of them are closing. And how can parents be sure that Catholic schools uphold the faith?

This third season of Religious Freedom Matters is devoted to the urgent topic of school choice. In the first episode, we hear a powerful message from Bishop Thomas Daly of Spokane, Washington, chair of the USCCB’s Committee on Catholic Education.

“We need as many of our kids in Catholic schools as possible,” says Bishop Daly — “but we have to be honest that we have some Catholic schools that have lost their mission.” So they have to preach the authentic faith — and also resist the idea favored by some younger priests that we should be happy with “a smaller, purer Church.”

The bishop talks frankly about his time as a teacher in a Catholic high school in Marin County, California, which, he says, had “lost its way” to the point where some teachers “who claimed to be Catholic did everything to undermine the mission.” One of them was even reading tarot cards in class. Now — thanks partly to Bishop Daly, who became its president — it’s a flourishing faith-filled school that produces vocations.

The bishop’s conversation with me and my co-host, Joan Desmond of the National Catholic Register, is encouraging. He says he tells parents that Catholic schools’ ultimate aim is to get their sons and daughters into heaven — “but before that, we have to get them into a good college, and you can do both.”

Joan Frawley Desmond, Andrea Picciotti-Bayer Audio March 7, 2022

National Catholic Register · Season 3 (Ep. 1) — Bishop Thomas Daly: ‘School Choice Is Coming to America‘

Embassy of China: “Falun Gong is a Cult”

https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zt/ppflg/t36570.htm

Falun Gong Is a Cult (November 1, 1999) There is plenty of evidence to prove that Falun Gong is no ordinary illegal organization, but a cult. A prominent feature of a cult is its hierarchical structure, through which practitioners strictly follow the instructions of the cult leader and are willing to sacrifice themselves for this spiritual leader. Li Hongzhi, founder of the Falun Gong cult, demands that his disciples think, act and even give their lives at his command, it says. Members of a cult are subject to a systematic form of mind control, and Falun Gong is no exception. Li entices his disciples with the bait of physical fitness, brainwashes his followers with his heretical ideas and intimidates Falun Gong practitioners with his “super powers.” In order to gather more followers to his flock, Li fabricated heretical ideas such as the “doomsday” theory and the belief that the Earth will explode so as to frighten his disciples into following his instructions without question. Li said he alone can postpone the explosion of the Earth, he alone can help Falun Gong practitioners enter heaven, and Falun Dafa alone can save all human beings. Incomplete statistics show that more than 1,400 people across China have died as a result of practicing Falun Gong, and hundreds of others have suffered psychological distress. The Falun Gong organization collected money from its followers through illegal publication and sales of books, pictures, video and audio tapes, and other forms of communication which spread Li’s lies. Li and other core members of the organization became rich through exploiting the wealth and labour of Falun Gong practitioners and by dodging taxes. Li is reported to have fat bank accounts overseas. Falun Gong is also a tightly organized cult. Its supreme organ in China is the Falun Dafa Research Society (FDRS) in Beijing. Under the FDRS, there are 39 general stations, 1,900 instruction centres, and 28,263 exercising sites, controlling a total of 2.1 million practitioners. Li tricked the practitioners of Falun Gong into joining his “kingdom,” and gradually separated them from the society, eventually convincing them to fight against it. Since Li ordered his followers to surround Guangming Daily in August 1996, Falun Gong has held 78 illegal demonstrations, each with more than 300 people. Thousands of followers gathered outside Zhongnanhai, the compound accommodating the Communist Party’s Central Committee, on April 25 this year in the most flagrant breach of the law. No government can turn a blind eye to the cult’s illegal deeds in threatening people’s lives and social stability.

Communism — The Epoch Times

Dear Reader,   Russia, although formerly ruled by communism, is behaving like a communist country by controlling media for its citizens while it continues to invade Ukraine, bombing civilian structures, killing hundreds of innocent people, and seizing control of their largest nuclear power plant.   Meanwhile, enormous human rights atrocities are being committed to millions of other innocent people by one of Russia’s closest communist allies: the Chinese Communist Party.   We staff members at The Epoch Times know this all too well. Many of us escaped to America after living under communist regimes. We are all too familiar with the oppression, suffering and death communism creates.   But it doesn’t happen all at once. Communist regimes do not just pop up and steal their citizens’ freedoms all at once. It starts small.   Communism starts with censorship. Certain ideas or beliefs, whether they are true or not, are silenced. Anyone who disagrees with the communist regime is silenced and punished. Opposing political parties are silenced. Not all at once, but little bits at a time. After that, freedoms and liberties are slowly taken away from the citizens. This is almost always done under the guise that it is “short term and to keep everyone safe.” There is no question that communism is rapidly enveloping our Great Nation. But there is hope. We are still early in the process.  We can stop the spread.   And the best way to stop the spread of communism is by spreading the Truth. Here at The Epoch Times, we are fighting day and night to continue to report the news to you in Truth and Tradition.  And we need your help. Please subscribe today. Your subscription will directly help fight communism by helping us continue to report the facts, unbiased and without narrative.   Thank you for continuing to help us fight the spread of communism by reporting the Truth. Sincerely, The Epoch Times Staff

The Epoch Times is associated with Falun Gong